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ELVIN COON, et ux and et al,
Defendants,
and
LEONARD A. TRIMBLE and
ALICE TRIMBLE, his wife,
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Respondents.
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No. 8724

Appellants' Brief
FACTS
This appeal is taken by Webster's, Inc., from an
Order granting a Summary Judgment against this
Defendant.
The parties in this brief will be referred to as they
appeared in the Court below with Ward C. Holbrook and
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Mabel F. Holbrook being the Plaintiffs, and Webster's,
Inc., being one of the Defendants, and Leonard A. Trimble and Alice Trimble being another Defendant but also
a Respondent. It should be noted throughout that Webster's, Inc., was the successor to Webster Coal and Lumber Co. It should further be noted that the Plaintiffs are
the Assignees of the Real Estate Mortgage originally
taken by Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association ( R 11), and that the Trimbles are the successors
in interest of the builder, Elvin Coon.
On September 7, 1956, the Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit
against the Defendant, Webster's, Inc., and others seeking to foreclose a Mortgage on some real property in
Davis County, State of Utah, and set out in the Complaint that this Defendant, among others, claimed a lien
right for materials and labor furnished to the property.
Mr. Elvin Coon was a general contractor and builder of
homes in Salt Lake and Davis Counties and had built the
home in question, together with another home on an adjacent lot, but because of financial problems had been
unable to pay all of the creditors, including the materialmen, for work performed upon the property. The Defendant, Webster's, Inc., filed a materialman's lien
against the property of Mr. Coon, which lien was recorded
on April11, 1956, in Book 103, at Page 57 4. This lien was
for $2,443.14. The lien "Tas referred to in Plaintiffs' Complaint and recognized by the Plaintiffs as haYing been
recorded. In filing this lien, Elvin Coon was referred to
by Webster's, Inc. in the Notice of Lien as "The contractor and owner and the reputed owner of said prem-
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ises ... " (Exh. D1) The Defendant, Webster's, Inc.
answered Plaintiff's Complaint and set up its claims to
the materialman's lien and asked for the foreclosure of
said lien. Pursuant to a notice filed by Plaintiffs and
on March 2, 1957, the Defendants appeared and proved
up their liens as shown by Exhibits A to D inclusive and
1 to 8 inclusive. On March 29, 1957, only the Plaintiffs,
Mr. and Mrs. Holbrook, filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment pursuant to U. R. C. P. 56. Argument was had
on this Motion for Summary Judgment and a Memorandum submitted by both parties (R 32). Thereafter,
the Court on June 18, 1957, signed an Order granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and on June
28, 1957, signed an Order granting Summary Judgment
to the Defendant Leonard A. Trimble and Alice Trimble
against this Defendant and others. This Defendant now
appeals from the Orders granting the Summary
Judgments.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN GRANTING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN GRANTING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
There appears to be only two possible points which
could be raised to permit the Court to to grant the Summary Judgment. The first of these points would be
3
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whether or not the record unequivocally shows that the
Defendant Webster's, Inc. failed to properly file and
record a lien as required by the statutes of the State of
Utah, and the second point would be whether or not the
Defendant Webster's, Inc. has ever released its lien and
claim to any lien. The applicable statutory provisions of
the Utah Code relating to the filing of mechanic's liens are
found in Title 38, Chapter 1, U. C. A., 1953, and the provisions which affect this action in particular are as
follows:
'' 38-1-2. Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by contract, express or implied, with the
owner, as in this chapter provided, shall be deemed
an original contractor, and all other persons doing
work or furnishing materials shall be deemed
subcontractors.''
"38-1-7. Every original contractor within eighty
days after the completion of his contract, and except as hereinafter provided, eYer~~ person other
than the original contractor claiming the benefit of
this chapter within sixty days after furnishing the
last material or performing the last labor for or on
any land, building, improvement or structure, or
for any alteration, addition to or repair thereof, or
performance of any labor in, or furnishing any
materials for, any mining or mining claim must file
for record with the county recorder of the county
in which the property or some part thereof, is situated a claim in writing-, containing a notice of
intention to hold and claim a lien, and a statement
of his demand after deducting all just credits and
offsets, with the name of the owner, if known, and
also the name of tlw person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished the material, with
a statement of the terms, time giYen and condi-
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tions of his contract, specifying the time when the
first and last labor was performed, or the first and
last material was furnished, and also a description
of the property to be charged with the lien, sufficient for identification, which claim must be verified by the oath of himself or some other person.
''When a subcontractor or any person furnished
labor or material as stated above at the instance
and request of an original contractor, then such
subcontractor's or person's lien rights, as set
forth herein, are extended so as to make the final
date for the filing of a notice of intention to hold
and claim a lien sixty days after completion of the
original contract o fthe original contractor.''
In this particular case, the record shows that the
Defendant, Webster's, Inc. delivered the last materials
to the job on January 18, 1956 (Defendant's Exhibit No.
2), and the record further shows that this Defendant
recorded its lien against the property on April 11, 1956
(R-4 and Defendant's Exhibit No. 1). Thus the Defendant Webster's, Inc. lien was filed eighty-three days after
the last materials were furnished by this Defendant. The
question then becomes whether or not the record unequivocally shows that Elvin Coon was the owner of the real
estate so that this Defendant would have to be a general
contractor and, therefore, filed its lien within eighty days
or whether it had sixty days after the general construction was completed. There is no doubt but what the lien
has been recorded within sixty days after the last labor
and materials were performed upon the property. The
notice of lien filed by Webster's, Inc. defines Mr. Elvin
Coon as being '-'the contractor and owner and reputed
5
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owner of said premises." (Defendant's Exhibit No. 1)
This makes the record questionable as to whether Mr.
Coon was the ''owner'' or ''contractor'' and as such the
record is not unequivocal that Mr. Coon was the owner.
The Affidavit filed in this matter by Mr. William C.
Quigley (R-39) shows that Prudential Federal Savings
and Loan Association dealt with Mr. Coon as the contractor in building said home and that Mr. Coon was held
out as being the contractor of said home. This Affidavit
is made by Mr. Quigley, who was the loan officer for
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association and
who handled and dealt with Mr. Coon in the matter of the
building of this home. Since Prudential Federal Savings
and Loan Association dealt with ~ir. Coon as the general
contractor the Plaintiffs are in exactly the same position
since they are suing to foreclose a mortgage as assignees
of Prudential Federal (R 11). U. R. C. P. 13(j) provides
as follows:
"Except as otherwise pro·dded by law as to negotiable jnstruments and assignments of aeeounts
rer(·ivabie, any claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
which could have been asserted against an assignor at the time of or before notice of such
assignment, may be asserted against his assignee,
to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the
elaim of the assignee.''
This rule also applies in the assignments of a mortgage
by a mortgagee as follows :
''The general rule is that an assignee of a mort~
gage is Yl'sted \\'ith the powers and rights of the
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mortgagee as fully as if he had been made such in
the mortgage, but succeeds to no greater rights
than those possessed by the assignor. Under this
general rule, the assignee of a mortgage securing
a non-negotiable obligation, even though he is a
bona fide purehaser for value, takes subject to all
existing equities which would have been effective
as against the mortgagee. This is true as to equities between the original parties, and all defenses
existent at the time of the assignment which might
have been interposed by the mortgagor against the
mortgagee or the assignor." (37 Am. Jur. p. 448)
The Affidavit of Mr. Lyle D. Webster, who is the
President of Webster's, Inc. and was the sole proprietor
of the predecessor of Webster's, Inc., Webster Coal and
Lumber Company, states that he was acquainted with Mr.
Coon and that Mr. Coon was engaged in the general contracting business and building of homes and that during
the construction of this home he represented to the affiant
that he was the general contractor in the building of this
particular home. (R37) We respectfully submit that
there is therefore a general issue of fact as to whether or
not the Defendant Webster's, Inc. dealt with Mr. Coon
as the contractor or the owner of the real property. Admittedly, anyone who deals with the owner of the real
property is a contractor under our statutes; however,
we take the position that in this case we have a different
situation than covered by the statute because the Defendant Elvin Coon held himself out as being the general
contractor and therefore is estopped to deny that he was
the general contractor of the property. The Defendants,
Mr. and Mrs. Trimble, are his successors in interest and
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take subject to his right and subject to any defenses
available against him. These liens were of record before
the Trimbles secured their quitclaim deed to the property.
In fact, the quitclaim deed given by Mr. Coon to Mr. and
Mrs. Trimble recited:
"Grantees are aware that there are lien claims
against the property, in excess of its value, and
that the grantors herein are about to file a petition
in bankruptcy."
Since Mr. and Mrs. Trimble obtained their interest
by means of a quitclaim deed they take the property subject to all the equities and defenses that could be asserted
against the grantor. This is true not only because the
deed recites the interests of the lien claimants but is also
shown by the general rule set forth in the annotation in
44 A.L.R. 1266 at page 1269, as follows:
''It may be stated, therefore, that as a general rule
the holder of such a deed (quitclaim deed) takes
the land conveyed subject to all 'outstanding interests and equities shown by the records and such
as are discoverable by the exercise of reasonable
diligence. ' '
The law is well established as to the quantity of
proof necessary to procure a Summary Judgment.
Rule 56, U.R.C.P. (c) proYides in part:
''The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, shou· that
thrre is no grnuine issue as to any material fact,
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law .... '' (Emphasis added)
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Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 6, in discussing Rule
56, says:
''The function of the summary judgment is to
avoid a useless trial; and a trial is not only useless (sic) but absolutely necessary where there is
a genuine issue as to any material fact. In ruling
on a motion for summary judgment, the court's
function is to determine whether such a genruine
issue exists, not to resolve amy existing factual
issues. This function is analogous to the practice
of Rule 50, genuine issues of material fact are not
to be resolved by the judge because both sides
have moved for summary judgment.'' (Page 2101)
(Emphasis added)
"The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden
of showing the absence of any genuine issues as to
all the material facts, which, under applicable
principals of substantive law, entitled him to judgment. as a matter of law. The courts hold the
movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden, the movant must make a showing that is quite
clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real
doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of
material fact ... And the papers supporting movant's are closely scrutinized, while the opposing
papers are indulgently treated, in determining
whether the movant has satisfied his burden.''
(Page 2123)
We respectfully submit that there is a genuine issue
of fact as to whether or not Elvin Coon held himself out
as being a general contractor on the property and as a
general contractor giving the individuals who supplied
materials to him the rights of a sub-contractor with the
right to file a lien within sixty days after the final work
was completed upon the property. Certainly Elvin Coon
9
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was estopped to claim any other position than that of a
general contractor as shown by the Affidavits on file
herein. Certainly in this case the Defendant Elvin Coon
held himself out as being a general contractor on the
property and this was relied upon by the Appellants
herein to their damage, which is certainly the matter of
an estoppel.
Elvin Coon built a home on the adjacent property at
about the same time this home was built and Mr. Coon
sold this. Obviously Mr. Coon was in the building business. He built and sold homes. This was his general occupation. He was a licensed general contractor in the State
of Utah (R 38).
The Motion for Summary Judgment should not have
been granted as being based upon the Receipt and Lien
Release shown as Plaintiff's Exhibit A. This Receipt and
Lien Release is an acknowledgment by Webster Coal and
Lumber Company of a partial payment for labor and/or
materials furnished upon the property in litigation. On
the face of this instrument it is shown as a ''Contractors
Authorization for Payment" and authorizes Prudential
Federal Savings and Loan Association to pay to \Y ebster
Coal and Lumber Company a sum of money for and on
account of labor and materials deliYered and to be
charged to a particular loan. It is significant to note that
Elvin Coon signed both of these forms as the ''Contractor," as is shown on the form. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit A) The reverse side of this form states:
''This receipt is executed and delivered by the undersigned to the Association to induce it to make
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payment to the undersigned of the above stated
sum fom the funds held by it for the owner of the
above described real property and in consideration
thereof the undersigned hereby waives, releases
and discharges any lien or right to lien the undersigned has or may hereafter acquire against said
real property.'' (Plaintiff's Exhibit A)
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This Lien Release was given only for a partial payment
to cover the amount of money shown on the Lien Release.
( R. 37) In saying that they release and discharge any
Lien which they have or may hereafter acquire against
the property, the same was referring to the sum of
money as shown on the Lien Release and not as to any
future deliveries for merchandise and materials delivered after the date of the Lien Release nor to release any
amount in excess of the sum shown. The Affiadvit of Mr.
Webster clearly states that the Release was given as a
partial Release and for the amount of the payment only.
(R 37) We do not dispute the fact that it is possible for
a person to enter into a contract whereby he waives future
Lien rights. We do, however, dispute the fact that the
record in this case clearly shows that such was the intent
of the parties when they executed the Receipt and Lien
Release hereinabove referred to. The evidence must be
clear and unequivocal in order to support a Summary
Judgment. ( Yowng vs. Felornia (1952) 121 Utah 646,
( Cert. denied 344 US 885; 976 ed. 685) 244 P. 2d 862;
Ulibarri vs. Christenson 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P. 2d J70)
We submit that in this case the evidence is not clear and
unequivocal. The Affidavit of Mr. Webster, which must be
accepted as evidence of the facts stated therein. The
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Affidavit clearly shows that the Receipt and Lien Release
was not given as a Release of all Liens against the property but rather a Release only to the extent of the payment. Defendant's Exhibit No. 2 clearly shows that considerable materials were purchased after the date of the
final "Receipt and Lien Release." The ledger card
attached to Defendant's Exhibit No. 2 shows that these
payments were only partial payments on a considerably
larger balance.
SUMMARY
The Appellant respectfully requests the Court toreverse the District Court and permit the evidence to be
presented to show the true position of the parties, and respectfully submits that there is no evidence here to support a Summary Judgment in that there is a conflict as
to whether or not Mr. Coon was the contractor or owner
of the property in question; and further that the Receipt
and Lien Release was given in satisfaction of partial payment only and was neither intended nor given to waive
all future lien rights to the property.
Respectfully submitted,
DEAN E. CONDER
NIELSEN AND CONDER
Attorneys for Appellant
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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